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INTERNATIONAL REGULATION AND
CONTROL OF THE PRODUCTION AND
USE OF CHEMICALS AND
PESTICIDES: PERSPECTIVES FOR
A CONVENTION
Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz *
INTRODUCTION'

A.

Purpose of the Analysis

A wide variety of instruments and mechanisms for the regulation
and control of chemicals and pesticides is already available internationally. What is missing is an analysis that attempts to systematize
the different approaches, to create transparency, to define where they
overlap, and to discover prospective deficiencies and shortcomings. In
order to accomplish this task, this article covers legally binding rules
as well as recommendations and codes - the international soft law.
The overall purpose is to outline a framework for future international
regulation of chemicals and pesticides and to propose an international
2
convention as a possible solution.
B.

Points Needing Analysis

International legal instruments require discussion, not only to de* Full Professor, Berlin School of Economics. Formerly Senior Researcher at the Center for
European Legal Policy in Bremen, Germany and Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy.
1. This article is a revised version of the report presented to the IRPTC/UNEP Ad Hoc
Working Group of Experts on the Implementation of the Amended London Guidelines at its first
session in Nairobi, October 15-19, 1990. Analysis of International Legal Instruments to the
Regulation and Control of the Production and Use of Chemicals, Revised Version, UNEP/
PIC.WG.3/Inf.4 (1990). Footnotes and references are restricted to those that are indispensable
for the reading and the understanding of the text. The facts on the existing level of regulation are
largely based on the following two documents: OECD, ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE
ASPECTS OF CHEMICALS CONTROL: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ISSUES (1985)
[hereinafter OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS]; and UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME

SECRETARIAT,

COMPARATIVE

PROCEDURES AND LEGISLATIVE DEFINITIONS,
COMPARATIVE SURVEY].

SURVEY

OF

NATIONAL

NOTIFICATION

UNEP/WG. 112/4 (1985) [hereinafter UNEP

2. Cf. Philip Alston, International Regulation of Toxic Chemicals, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 397
(1978-79) (similarly advocating the international regulation of chemicals); Michael Kloepfer, Aspekte der internationalen Harmonisierung des Umweltrechts - Zur Rechtsvergleichung und
Rechtsvereinheitlichung,in CHEMIKALIENRECHT 9, 281 (1984).
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termine the scope of this article but also to establish a framework that
facilitates policy formulation in the field of chemicals and pesticides.
The London Guidelines, 3 like a number of other national initiatives, cover both chemicals and pesticides. Bringing together chemicals and pesticides in a single report entails a number of difficulties.
Chemicals and pesticides follow different regulatory schemes, at least
in the legislation of industrialized countries. This might be different in
developing countries, but the more the legislation is scrutinized the
more apparent it becomes that each product category, whether chemicals, pesticides, food additives, cosmetics, or medicines, is dealt with
separately. International regulation must consider these differences
and respond to product-specific national rules.
United Nations Environment Programme Governing Council
(UNEP GC) Decision 15/30 refers to "other activities related to the
production and use of chemicals. '' 4 This statement is unclear. International regulation might cover trade in chemicals, but it might also
cover production, as is the case with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at
Work.5 A distinction can be made between process regulation and
product regulation: 6 process regulation aims at the manufacturing
process, product regulation at trade. This article mainly focuses on
product regulation, but process regulation is considered with respect
to the feasibility of banning the production, as opposed to merely the
use, of certain extremely dangerous chemicals and pesticides.
The last point needing clarification concerns the types of instruments available for international pesticide and chemical regulation.
One possibility is harmonization of the different national approaches
in order to define a level of protection and control with worldwide
acceptability. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and
Use of Pesticides 7 is an example of such harmonization. Another pos3. UNEP LONDON GUIDELINES FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON CHEMICALS IN
(Amended 1989). [hereinafter AMENDED LONDON GUIDELINES].

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

4. Decision 15/30 of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Pro-

gramme, Environmentally Safe Management of Chemicals, in Particular Those That Are Banned
and Severely Restricted in InternationalTrade, reprinted in 19 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 125 (1989).
5. International Labour Organisation, Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals
at Work, art. 2(c)(i), 73 OFFICIAL BULL. 71, 73 (1990) [hereinafter ILO Convention].
6. ECKARD REHBINDER & RICHARD STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION POLICY

(Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience vol. 2, Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 1985).
7. United Nations FAO Conference Resolution 10/85 International Code of Conduct on the
Distribution and Use of Pesticides, [Reference Binder I] Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 41:3001 (1985)
[hereinafter FAO Code of Conduct].
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sibility would be to allow regulatory differences but develop mechanisms to bridge those differences, especially between exporting and
importing countries. The London Guidelines 8 and other efforts 9 to
regulate the export of banned and severely restricted products are in
this category. The intention is not to abolish existing differences in the
legal status of regulated chemicals and pesticides but to find ways to
secure their trade even though they are banned or severely restricted.
It is therefore necessary to clearly distinguish between efforts that attempt to harmonize international regulation and efforts that aim to
balance differences in the regulatory status of chemicals and pesticides.
C. Scope of the Analysis
This article cannot be restricted to international efforts. It must
consider the key role of some industrialized countries in chemical and
pesticide regulation. Specific emphasis is put on the role of the European Community (EC). With its policy of completing the internal
market by 1992,10 the EC has become the most important international organization in developing regulatory frameworks that unite
different national schemes. European initiatives to harmonize chemical and pesticide regulations are important far beyond the borders of
the twelve Member States. Due to the enormous importance of the
EC market to European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries,
the Europeanization of chemical and pesticide regulation based on
Community law is close at hand. International efforts to regulate pesticides and chemicals by the FAO, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), and the ILO can be analyzed against the background of the numerous regulatory efforts of the European Community and industrialized countries.
The different national, regional, and international laws and regulations will be dealt with by following the development of regulatory
instruments and strategies designed to control risks to humans and to
the environment. Regulation traditionally starts in industrialized
countries with efforts to manage trade in chemicals and pesticides."1
The overall goal is to protect both the user of the product and those
workers who may come into contact with it. Therefore, regulations
8. AMENDED LONDON GUIDELINES, supra note 3.

9. See infra Part I(E).
10. For an analysis, see generally 1992: ONE EUROPEAN MARKET? A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE COMMISSION'S INTERNAL MARKET STRATEGY (Roland Bieber et al. eds., 1988).

11. See Hans-W. Micklitz, Zur Geschichte des deutschen Pflanzenschutzrechts, in BREMER
KOLLOQUIUM UBER PFLANZENSCHUTZ 44 (Eckard Rehbinder ed., 1991) (concerning the his-

tory of regulation of pesticides).
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are adopted to classify products according to risk, to ensure adequate
packaging and labeling, and to control advertising. Later, regulatory
emphasis shifts from trade regulation to access-to-market regulation.
States protect their citizens and the environment against harm from
dangerous chemicals and pesticides by controlling market access.
There are different regulatory models, notification procedures, registration procedures, and/or licensing procedures, but they all try to
guarantee preventive protection against potential risks. The shift from
trade regulation to access-to-market regulation logically increases the
degree of protection, but even access-to-market rules cannot guarantee
sufficient long-term protection to humans and the environment. A
common characteristic of chemicals and pesticides is that their specific
risks are unknown when they are brought onto the market and only
become clear after years of use and experience. Then the question
arises as to how, and even if, these products can be taken off the market. The term of art for regulatory efforts to rid the market of danger2
ous products is postmarket control.'
The analysis of export regulation focuses on existing mechanisms
used by international and regional organizations (e.g., UNEP, FAO,
the United Nations (U.N.), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the GATT, and the EC) and by various States to regulate the exports of chemicals. Information exchange
procedures, export notification, and the recently introduced Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure define the requirements for trade
with banned and severely restricted chemicals.
I.

NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
PESTICIDES AND CHEMICALS

A.

Regulatory Concepts, Common Goals, and Definitions

The overall trend in chemical and pesticide regulation is to go beyond the protection of humans against exposure to chemicals and pesticides and to integrate the protection of the environment into the
regulatory framework. This extension entails a shift from protection
against acute damage or imminent danger to a consideration of potential hazards.' 3 Regulatory actions are no longer limited to cases of
actual harm. They now aim at protecting humans and the environment against the risks associated with chemicals. Therefore, the no12. See POST MARKET CONTROL OF CONSUMER GOODS (Zentrum fiir Europiische Recht-

spolitik [ZERP] Schriftenreihe, Band I1, Hans-W. Micklitz ed., 1990) (discussing the concept of
postmarket controls in comparative perspective).
13. Pesticides legislation aimed first at the protection of humans. In a second step, the legislation was extended to cover protection of the environment.
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tions of "risk," "hazard," and "danger" are crucial in all laws and
regulations. 14
Protection against risks may be incorporated in a particular law in
different ways. The OECD Paper on Administrative and Legislative
Aspects of Chemical Control,1 5 as well as the UNEP Comparative
Survey of National Notification Procedures and Legislative Definitions,1 6 distinguishes among:
(1) the notion of risk being incorporated in the general statement of purpose or goals provisions of a particular law;
(2) the notion of risk being incorporated in statutory provisions that describe individual duties of care, especially in countries that vest in the
manufacturer or importer the primary responsibility for assessing the
risks associated with chemicals;
(3) the notion of risk being incorporated by chemical laws in a number
of risk categories representing defined dangerous properties of chemicals;
and
(4) the notion of risk being incorporated in statutory7 provisions that authorize agencies to take specific regulatory action.'
8
Further details can be drawn from the OECD and UNEP papers.'
The overall trends reported in these two analyses have been
strengthened and specified. No common approach, however, can be
found in the answers to the questions of whether and to what extent
occupational health and safety considerations should be integrated
into chemical and pesticide regulation. For some countries, occupational health and safety regulations are crucial for the development of
sophisticated chemical regulation (e.g., the United Kingdom).19 Other
countries integrate aspects of occupational health and safety into
chemical and pesticide regulation (e.g., Germany's Gefahr20
stoffverordnung).
The integration of environmental protection into chemical and pesticide regulation constitutes a shift from product-related to media-related regulation. Product-related regulation focuses on the specific
risks of the respective products (e.g., chemicals, pesticides); media-re14. See ECKARD REHB1INDER ET AL., CHEMIKALIENGESETZ-KOMMENTAR
VORSCHRIFTEN ZUM CHEM1KALIENRECHT 37 (1985).

UND RECHTS-

15. OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1.
16. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1.
17. See OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 7, 10.
18. Id.; see also UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1.
19. See OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 5, 7, 11-13, 18-24, 27.
20. Eckard Rehbinder, Harmonisierung des Chemikalienrechts?." Die Harmonisierungswirkungen der Richtlinie 79/831/EWG in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europaischen Gemeinschaften
im Lichte des deutschen Rechts, in 3 CHEMIKALIENRECHT 79-139 (Gesellschaft ftir Rechtspolitik
1986). The report is an analysis of the implementation of the Sixth Amendment of the Chemicals
Directive.
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lated regulation provides for the protection of humans and environment independent of the nature of the respective product. A mediarelated approach encompasses all kinds of products - chemicals, pesticides, medicines, food additives, cosmetics - and questions the extent to which criteria can be found to protect humans and the
environment against potential risks. Even modem chemical laws do
not really pursue a media-related approach. 2' Some rules contain elements of a media-related approach, but exception clauses make clear
22
that product-related regulations overrule media-related controls.
This differentiation, which is quite common in most of the industrialized countries, leads to the paradoxical consequence that the ultimate
use determines the applicable legislation. In other words, pesticides,
medicines, food additives, and cosmetics are all "chemicals," but their
different uses make it necessary to decide whether to apply specific
product-related laws or the basic chemical regulations. That is why
chemical regulation, in practice, focuses on industrial chemicals as a
specific category of products, distinguishing them from pesticides and
other "chemicals" like medicines or food additives.
Product-related regulation requires a definition of legal scope.
There is no common understanding of the terms "chemical" and "pesticide." In the field of chemicals, specific difficulties arise in differentiating between industrially manufactured chemicals and preparations.
European Economic Community (EEC) Directive 67/548 (as
amended by the Sixth Amendment) (dangerous substances)) 23 and EC
Directive 91/414/EEC (pesticides) 24 provide some guidance on what
is meant by the terms chemical and pesticide. Guidance does not
mean that all possible problems are solved. It remains unclear
whether preparations containing a chemical regulated by the Sixth
Amendment fall under the Sixth Amendment or are excluded from
that directive. 25 The OECD has developed a glossary of definitions
used by industrialized States, mainly OECD members, in their chemi21. See Council Directive 79/831 of 18 September 1979 Amending for the Sixth Time Directive 67/548/EEC on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions
Relating to the Classification, Packaging and Labelling of Dangerous Substances, pmbl. & art. 1,
1979 O.J. (L 259) 10-11 [hereinafter Sixth Amendment]. This Council Directive is a typical
product of an ambitious approach. Starting from a broad concept of protection which approaches media-related thinking, the Directive's scope is narrower than would be expected from
the preamble. See also OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, tbl. 3, at 16.
22. OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, tbl. 3, at 16.
23. Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, art. 2(1)(a)-(b), at 11.
24. Council Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 Concerning the Placing of Plant Protection Products on the Market, art. 2(1) & (3), 1991 O.J. (L 230) 1, 3.
25. Rehbinder, supra note 20.

Spring 1992]

Chemicals and Pesticides

cal legislation. 26 The glossary is helpful in understanding regulatory
differences, but at the same time it shows that there is not yet a common understanding, even among the industrialized nations.
The same is more or less true for the definition of pesticides. EC
Directive 91/414/EEC provides a common framework for the Member States, but its definition differs from the notion in the U.S. Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).27 From an international perspective, the FAO Code of Conduct on the Distribution
and Use of Pesticides supplies a glossary instrumental to the interna28
tional regulation of pesticides.
As to the selection of control action, there are still substantial differences in the language and the structure of the laws. 29 The relationship between different levels of risks, the basis of their determination,
and the selection of control action is subject to different national regulatory approaches. One might summarize the findings of the OECD
Analysis and the UNEP Comparative Survey as formulating a "hierarchical system" that links differing degrees of risks to the selection of
control action.3 0 Under this system, levels of control stringency are
triggered by corresponding levels of risk. There is an interdependence
31
between the degree of risk and the intensity of regulation.
Modern chemical and pesticide laws do not require a causal link
between a substance and its potential hazards. 32 Statistical evidence
and scientific research indicating that a hazard exists usually suffices
to legitimate preventive action. However, the mere potential of a risk
does not justify measures as severe as restricting or banning the use or
production of a specific chemical or pesticide. More concrete evidence
is needed for such actions. One might even conclude from the experience with chemical and pesticide legislation in industrialized countries
that market restrictions are adopted only in cases where the causal
link between the damage and the substance can no longer be denied.
Although it is already a long way from the potential risk to the acute
risk, there is a third category that requires an even higher degree of
risk than in the case of market restriction: emergency situations.
26. OECD, CHEMICALS CONTROL LEGISLATION AN INTERNATIONAL GLOSSARY OF KEY
TERMS (1982).
27. Compare Council Directive 91/414/EEC, supra note 24, art. 2(1) & (3), at 3 with the

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1988).
28. FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 7.

29.. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 23-24; OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 14.
30. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 23.
31. Id.
32. OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 14.
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Here, the existence of an imminent danger triggers intervention to mit33
igate the risk.

Other countries leave their agencies more discretion in selecting
appropriate controls. This is particularly true for the United States
where there is a sequence of increasingly stringent prerequisites (in
terms of probability of risks and necessary basis for their determination), from requiring testing in order to gather sufficient information
to final control action. 34 Although the regulatory approach of the European Community and its Member States on the one hand and the
United States on the other seems to be different, in actual practice the
similarity in interdependence between the degree of risk and selection
of control action is striking.
Some inherent limits are, though varying in their legal grounding,
recognized in most legal systems. These limiting rules, according to
the OECD Report, require agencies:
a) not to overstep the limits of discretion set out in a law or inherently
contained in a delegation of powers;
b) not to disregard the scope of discretion available under a legal
authorization;
c) to make use of the discretionary powers in a fair and reasonable manner, avoiding5 arbitrariness, clear errors of judgment and other abuses of
discretion.

3

Tables in the Report help the reader to visualize the linkage between
control action and the degree of danger. 36 They show a complicated
and sophisticated system that leaves some doubt as to whether the
finely tuned differences in hazards and actions are manageable by the
agencies.
In adopting specific legislation on chemicals and pesticides, States
are assuming the responsibility to protect their citizens and the environment against risks resulting from unsafe chemicals and pesticides.
Accepting a statutory responsibility for human safety and the environment entails far-reaching constitutional consequences. 37 It is no
longer the liberal State guaranteeing individual rights to liberty and
freedom. Rather, it is the new welfare State accepting the responsibility to ensure protection, safety, and a healthy environment. Such an
extension of responsibilities is not limited to industrialized countries.
33. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 23. This is the system that exists in the

European Community and its Member States.
34. Id.
35. OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note i, at 27-28.

36. Id. tbls. 2 & 4, at 13, 21.
37. See generally Hans-W. Micklitz, Consumer Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW 53, 72-89 (Andrew Clapham et al. eds., 1991)
[hereinafter Consumer Rights].
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Here, the rights of classical liberalism might be interpreted in light of
the new statutory functions as is the case in Germany. New democracies like Spain and Portugal have used their Constitutions to make the
protection of humans and the environment a State objective, even a
constitutional task. 38 However, even where health, safety, and environmental protection are not discussed at the constitutional level, the
existence of a statutory responsibility is widely accepted. The U.S.
Constitution does not recognize social rights;3 9 its protection is limited
to the classical liberal rights - individual liberty and freedom. Nevertheless, the United States has within the last twenty years developed
the furthest-reaching statutes designed to guarantee the protection of
humans and the environment against chemicals, pesticides, and other
devices.4°
At the international level, article 12 of the International Covenant
41
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights includes a right to health,
and the 1972 Stockholm Declaration established the agenda for later
international efforts to guarantee a healthy environment. 42 The legal
status of these documents remains the subject of a controversial debate, but their mere existence makes it clear that, even in the international arena, rights to safety and a healthy environment are now
important considerations. Both could establish the structure for the
legitimate development of an international regime for the regulation of
chemicals and pesticides. In the long run, trade regulations have to
43
account for health, safety, and environmental concerns.
B.

Classification, Labeling, Packaging, and Advertising

In the history of chemical and pesticide regulation, rules on risk
classification, on associating specific risks to labeling requirements,
and on packaging were the first step in the development of chemical
and pesticide regulation.
38. Id. at 80-89.
39. 1 EBERHARD GRABITZ, GRUNDRECHTE IN EUROPA UND USA: STRUKTUREN NATIONALER SYSTEME (1986).
40. See Giandomenico Majone, Cross-NationalSources of Regulatory Policymaking in Europe and the United States, J. PuB. POL'Y, Spring 1991, at 79, 90-91, 98.
41. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, art. 12(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 8, 6 I.L.M. 360, 363-64 (entered into force Jan. 3,
1976). For further details, see Consumer Rights, supra note 37, at 92-94.
42. See Alston, supra note 2, at 410-12, 419 & 432.
43. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Effective Pollution Control in Industrialized Countries: International Economic Disincentives, Policy Responses and the GATT, 70 MICH. L. REV. 859 (1972);
see also ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE (Seymour J. Rubin & Thomas R. Graham eds., 1982);
Helmut Gr6ner, Umweltschutzbedingte Produktnormen als nichttarifdres Handelshemmnis, in
UMWELTPOLITIK UND WETrBEWERB 143 (Helmut Gutzler ed., 1981).
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1. Classification
The Sixth Amendment to EEC Directive 67/548/EEC provides
fourteen factors for determining hazardous characteristics within the
meaning of the directive: explosive, oxidizing, extremely flammable,
highly flammable, flammable, very toxic, toxic, harmful, corrosive, irritant, dangerous for the environment, carcinogenic, teratogenic, and
mutagenic. 44 EC Directive 78/631 provides a similar classification
scheme for pesticides, ranking them from very toxic, through toxic, to
harmful. Classification is based primarily on the acute oral and dermal toxicity to rats in accord with the standard procedures in toxicology. 4 5 EC Directive 88/379 extends classification to preparations
other than pesticides. 4 6 The classification scheme follows the principles laid down in Directive 67/548 on dangerous chemical substances,
supplemented by specific provisions on explosiveness, oxidizing ten47
dencies, extreme flammability, high flammability, or flammability.
These three directives provide a common classification scheme of dangerous substances, pesticides, and preparations throughout the European Community. They facilitate orientation on the market and
enhance the development of regulatory concepts based on
classification.
At the international level, numerous organizations have developed
classification schemes, for example, the efforts of the World Health
Organization (WHO) and of the International Register for Potentially
Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC) in the fields of chemicals and pesticides.
However, most of these classification systems are not linked to labeling
and packaging requirements. There are two notable differences. The
ILO Convention requires specific criteria and systems appropriate for
the classification of all chemicals according to the type and degree of
their intrinsic hazards. 48 According to the ILO Convention's Recommendations, classification should be based on characteristics such as:
toxic properties, including both acute and chronic health effects in all
target organs; chemical or physical characteristics, including flammability, explosiveness, oxidizing properties, and dangerous reactivity;
corrosive and irritant properties; carcinogenic effects; allergenic and
44. Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, art. 2(2), at 11-12.
45. Council Directive 78/631 of 26 June 1978 on the Approximation of the Laws of the
Member States Relating to the Classification, Packaging and Labelling of Dangerous Preparations (pesticides), art. 3, 1978 O.J. (L 206) 13, 14-15.
46. Council Directive 88/379 of 7 June 1988 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Relating to the Classification, Packaging
and Labelling of Dangerous Preparations, art. 3, 1988 O.J. (L 187) 14, 15-22.
47. Id.
48. ILO Convention, supra note 5, art. 6, at 73.
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sensitizing effects; teratogenic and mutagenic effects; and effects on the
reproductive system. 49 From a lawyer's point of view, the prerequisites are similar to EEC Directive 67/548.
The FAO Code refers to the WHO recommended classification of
pesticides by hazards as the starting point for labeling and packaging
requirements. 50 Classification in the WHO-recommended scheme differs from the EC Directive 78/63151 in that the WHO scheme distinguishes four categories of hazards: extremely hazardous, highly
hazardous, moderately hazardous, and slightly hazardous.
2.

Labeling and Packaging

At the EC level, the marketing of classified chemicals, pesticides,
and preparations is tied to labeling and packaging requirements.
Although the labeling and packaging requirements differ according to
the category of products concerned, the basic concept derives from
Directive 67/548.
Packaging must satisfy the following requirements:
(a) it shall be so designed and constructed that its contents cannot escape; this requirement shall not apply where special safety devices are
prescribed;
(b) the materials constituting the packaging and fastening must not be
susceptible to adverse attack by the contents, or liable to form harmful
or dangerous compounds with the contents;
(c) packaging and fastenings must be strong and solid throughout to ensure that they will not loosen and will safely meet the normal stresses
and strains of handling;
(d) containers fitted with replaceable fastening devices shall be so
designed that the 52packaging can be repeatedly refastened without the
contents escaping.
Member States are allowed to go beyond that mandatory level and
to prescribe additional requirements: that packages shall initially be
closed with a seal so that when the package is opened for the first time,
the seal is irreparably damaged; that containers with a capacity not
exceeding three liters that contain dangerous substances intended for
domestic use shall have child-resistant fastenings; and that containers
with a capacity not exceeding one liter that contain very toxic, toxic,
or corrosive liquids intended for domestic use shall carry a tactile
warning of danger. The options for packaging rules on child-resistant
49.
BULL.
50.
51.
52.

ILO, Recommendation ConcerningSafety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, 73 OFFICIAL
84, art. 6, at 85 (1990) [hereinafter ILO Recommendation].
FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 7, art. 10(2)(3).
Council Directive 78/631, supra note 45, art. 3, at 14-15.
Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, art. 15, at 16.
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fastenings and tactile warnings have been subject to controversial debate throughout the Community. Here, the Member States' packaging
53
rules differ considerably.
The packaging rules are supplemented by labeling rules. According to Directive 67/548, Member States have to ensure that dangerous
substances cannot be placed on the market unless the labeling on their
packages satisfies the following requirements:
Every package shall show clearly and indelibly the following:
- the name of the substance,
- the origin of the substance,
- the danger symbol, when laid down, and indication of danger involved in the use of the substance,
- standard phrases indicating the special risks arising from such
dangers,
- standard phrases
indicating the safety advice relating to the use of
54
the substance.
These factors are spelled out in the directive in some detail. Harmonization is nearly total. While some derogations are allowed, the Member States are obliged to inform the Commission of them. The
directives on pesticides and on dangerous preparations, 78/63155 and
88/37956 respectively, supplement the above mentioned prerequisites
by providing further product-related labeling requirements. It is hard
to distinguish the different packaging and labeling rules on dangerous
substances, pesticides, and preparations. Even the Community seems
to be somewhat confused. In its latest directive on dangerous preparations, 88/379, it indicated that the rules should be reviewed to discover where they differ and where loopholes need to be closed. 57
From an international perspective, it is important that the labeling and
packaging rules in the Community have been totally harmonized.
Products classified, labeled, and packaged according to these three directives58 can be marketed throughout the Community. There is,
however, one exception. When products do not fall within the scope
of the three directives, considerable differences between national provisions remain.
At the international level, packaging and labeling rules on pesticides and chemicals are mentioned in the GATT Agreement on Tech53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
rective

Rehbinder, supra note 20.
Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, art. 16(2), at 16.
Council Directive 78/63 1, supra note 45, arts. 6 & 7, at 16-17.
Council Directive 88/379, supra note 46, arts. 7 & 8, at 23-25.
Id. pmbl., at 15.
Council Directive 88/379, supra note 46; Sixth Amendment, supra note 21; Council Di78/631, supra note 45.
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nical Barriers to Trade. 59 In its preamble, the Agreement urges the
parties to ensure that both technical regulations and standards (including requirements for packaging, marking, and labeling) and methods
for certifying conformity with technical regulations and standards do
not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade. The Agreement, however, does not lay down minimum requirements in any form
as to the labeling and packaging of chemicals and pesticides as such.
It tries to eliminate possible technical barriers to trade resulting from
deviating labeling and packaging standards.
Quite specific rules on the labeling of chemicals and pesticides can
be found in the Convention on Safety in the Use of Chemicals at
Work. 60 The primary addressee of the "labeling and marking requirements" in the Convention is the employee, but the Convention applies
to all branches of economic activity in which chemicals are used in
enterprises, including production, handling, storage, transport, and
disposal.

61

Article 7 of the Convention requires signatory States to ensure that
hazardous chemicals are labeled so as to provide essential information
regarding their identity, their classification, the hazards they present,
and the safety precautions to be observed. The requirements of what
should be understood by readers of the label are found in the ILO
Recommendations. 62 Specifically, labeling requirements should cover,
in conformity with existing national or international systems:
(a) the information to be given on the label including as appropriate:
(i) trade names;
(ii) identity of the chemical;
(iii) name, address and telephone number of the supplier;
(iv) hazard symbols;
nature of the special risks associated with the use of the chemical;
(vi) safety precautions;
(vii) identification of the batch;
(viii) the statement that a chemical safety data sheet giving additional information is available from the employer;
(ix) the classification assigned under a system established by the
competent authority;
(b) the legibility, durability and size of the label;
63
(c) the uniformity of labels and symbols, including colours.
(v)

59. GATT, AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE pmbl. (1979) (currently

under revision in the Uruguay Round).
60. ILO Convention, supra note 5, art. 7, at 74; see also ILO Recommendation, supra note 49,
art. 8, at 86.
61. ILO Convention, supra note 5, arts. 2 & 7, at 73-74.
62. Id. art. 7, at 74; ILO Recommendation, supra note 49, art. 8, at 86.

63. ILO Recommendation, supra note 49, art. 8(2), at 86.
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Criteria for the preparation of chemical safety data and information sheets shall be established by the competent authorities, and then
the sheets shall be provided to employers. 64 There is no link, however,
between the classification of a substance and its labeling and packaging
with a view to marketing. Information on the dangerous aspects of
chemicals and pesticides could be improved indirectly here, but the
Convention is not aimed at regulating the trade in or the production of
chemicals and pesticides.
The FAO Code of Conduct institutes industrial and governmental
responsibilities for labeling and packaging for chemical safety, especially pesticides. 65 Pesticide containers should be clearly labeled in accordance with applicable international guidelines such as the FAO
Guidelines on Good Labeling Practices. 66 Article 10 of the FAO
Code then requires industry:
- to use labels that include recommendations consistent with those of
the recognized research and advisory agencies in the country of sale;
to include appropriate symbols and pictographs whenever possible in
addition to written instructions, warnings and precautions;
- to use labels that in international trade clearly show appropriate
WHO hazard classification of the contents or, if this is inappropriate
or inconsistent with the national regulations, use the relevant
classification;
to include in the appropriate language or languages, a warning
against the reuse of containers and instructions for the safe disposal
or decontamination of empty containers;
- to identify each lot or batch of product in numbers or letters that can
be read, transcribed or communicated by anyone, without the need
for codes or other means or deciphering;
- to use labels that are marked with the date, month and year of formulation of the lot or batch and 67
with the relevant information on the
storage stability of the product.
Article 10(3) refers to the packaging, storage, and disposal of pesticides which should be in conformity with the principles laid down in
the FAO Guidelines for the Packaging and Storage of Pesticides, 68 the
FAO Guidelines on the Disposal of Surplus Pesticides and Pesticides
Containers, 69 and the WHO Specifications for Pesticides used in Pub64. ILO Convention, supra note 5, art. 8, at 74.
65. FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 7, art. 10.
66. FAO, GUIDELINES ON GOOD LABELLING PRACTICE OF PESTICIDES, FAO Doc. COA6/
85/9 (1985); FAO, PICTOGRAMS FOR PESTICIDE LABELS.
67. FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 7, art. 10(2).

68. FAO,

GUIDELINES FOR THE PACKAGING AND STORAGE OF PESTICIDES

(1985).

69. FAO, GUIDELINES ON THE DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS PESTICIDES AND PESTICIDES CONTAINERS (1985).
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lic Health. 70 Finally, governments are invited to take the necessary
regulatory measures to prohibit the repacking, decanting, or dispensing of any pesticide into food or beverage containers and to enforce
71
rigidly punitive measures that effectively deter such practices.
The FAQ labeling and packaging rules for pesticides, although not
mandatory, are approaching the status of the national and regional
rules. They provide a minimum standard in labeling and packaging, a
minimum standard that has not yet been achieved in the field of chemical substances and preparations.
3. Advertising
Even modern chemical laws do not provide for mandatory advertising rules. This omission is due to the fact that chemical laws, in
principle, are restricted to industrially manufactured chemicals; they
exclude preparations dedicated to end-users. This is not the case when
chemicals like preparations or pesticides are sold in a manufactured
form to end-users. Here, advertising rules might be important to the
user. This is particularly true for pesticides, where there have been
reports of unfair practices, mainly from Third World countries. 72 Industrialized countries have not developed specific rules for pesticide
advertising. Pesticide advertising is usually subject to rules and regulations concerning unfair marketing practices. The point of reference
is not a specific category or product but the market transaction.
Equivalent rules do not yet exist on the international level, but the
International Chamber of Commerce and the United Nations have attempted to establish fair practices codes.
These efforts can be seen in the FAQ Code of Conduct. Article 11
73
provides extensive rules for the regulation of pesticide advertising.
The primary target of article 11 is industry itself, but international
organizations and public sector groups are invited to call attention to
departures from this article. 74 Under this code, governments are encouraged to work with manufacturers to take advantage of the manufacturers' marketing skills and infrastructures to provide public service
70.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, SPECIFICATIONS FOR PESTICIDES USED IN PUBLIC

HEALTH (1985).
71. FAQ Code of Conduct, supra note 7, art. 10(4).
72. See DAVID BULL, A GROWING PROBLEM: PESTICIDES AND THE THIRD WORLD POOR

92-123 (1982)

(illustrations of pesticide advertisements); Foo GAIK SIM, THE PESTICIDE

POISONING REPORT 3 (1985); DAVID WEIR & MARK SHAPIRO, CIRCLE OF POISON, PESTICIDES

AND PEOPLE IN A HUNGRY WORLD 40-43 (1981).
73. FAQ Code of Conduct, supra note 7, art. 11.
74. Id.; see also GRETrA GOLDENMAN & SAROVINI RENGAM, PROBLEM PESTICIDES, PESTICIDE PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1988).
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advertising regarding the safe and effective use of pesticides. 75 Such
advertising could focus on proper equipment use and maintenance,
special precautions for children and pregnant women, the danger of

reusing containers, and the importance of following label directions.
Although these general rules apply to all kinds of transactions, they
are shaped by the needs of the trade between pesticide-producing
States and Third World importing States.
C.

Premarket Control of Chemicals and Pesticides

76
The Sixth Amendment applies only to newly marketed products.
The U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), to the contrary, explicitly controls both old and new chemicals. 77 Pesticide control regu-

lations suffer from the same defect.

These regulations require

statutory review of all new products but do not provide similar scru78
tiny for products already on the market.

1. Spectrum of Preventive Control Measures
There are three types of preventive control: 79 prior approval procedures, notification procedures, and regulatory mechanisms in which
the primary responsibility rests with the manufacturer. The last category assumes there are no other statutory regulations of chemicals and
pesticides and that the manufacturer alone can decide what will be
manufactured and how it will be sold.
Most of the industrialized countries have introduced either prior
approval procedures or notification procedures, but there are still a
considerable number of developing countries without premarket control of chemicals and pesticides. 80 Notification procedures can be un75. FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 7, art. 11(3).
76. Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, pmbl., at 10.
77. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603(b)(1)(C), 2604(a) (1988) [hereinafter TSCA].
78. For a comparative analysis of the EC Sixth Amendment and the U.S. TSCA, see George
B. Wilkinson, The Sixth Amendment: Toxic Substance Control in the EEC, 12 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 461, 486-97 (1980); see also Robert A. Wyman, Jr., Control of Toxic Substances: The
Attempt to Harmonize the Notification Requirements of the U.S Toxic Substances Control Act
and the European Community Sixth Amendment, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 417 (1980). Although
somewhat outdated these two articles provide a valuable analysis of both regulatory schemes.
See generally International Regulation of Toxic Substances (panel discussion), 73 PROC. AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. 76 (1979) [hereinafter International Regulation of Toxic Substances]. For a more
recent perspective, see RONALD BRICKMAN ET AL., CONTROLLING CHEMICALS (1985).
79. See REHBINDER, supra note .14, at 5.
80. Review of Environmental Activities Related to the Production and Use of Chemicals,
UNEP Informal Consultative Meeting on the Implementation of the Amended London Guidelines, UNEP/PIC. CONS. 1/4 (1990); for a comparative analysis, see also REVUE JURIDIQUE
DE L'ENVIRONMENT, LES PESTICIDES EN DROIT COMPARI (1987).
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derstood as a mechanism of shared responsibility. The manufacturer
has to notify a competent authority of its intention to manufacture or
market a new chemical. The authority then takes the necessary steps
to ensure that the chemicals are adequately tested, classified, labeled,
and packaged. The procedure is different in countries where chemicals and pesticides are subject to a prior approval procedure. In those
States, the competent authorities must actually approve a chemical or
pesticide before it can be manufactured and marketed.
2.

Chemicals

Japan uses a substance-related licensing procedure. 8 1 It consists
both of a screening mechanism designed to assess the risks associated
with a particular substance and of a subsequent procedure of formal
control. It determines whether the substance belongs to the category
of "specified chemical substances." That category consists of substances that are persistent, tend to accumulate in living organisms, and
have toxic properties.8 2 The majority of chemical licensing schemes in
other States have a much more limited scope and purpose. Germany,
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland each have introduced a
licensing procedure to control the manufacture, sale, and/or use of
particularly hazardous substances. New Zealand only regulates the
sale of these substances. These procedures do not create general, sub83
stance-related chemical controls.
The licensing procedures in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have a broader purpose. Those procedures would allow the introduction of substance-related control. Under the Dutch chemical
regulation, a competent agency is authorized to deny a permit where
necessary to protect humans and the environment.8 4 It has been disputed whether the Sixth Amendment provides the opportunity to introduce such a licensing scheme. With respect to manufacture and
use, Member States are not bound by the directive as long as their
procedures are not seen as disguised attempts to control the marketing
of substances already notified under the directive and thus freely available for sale in the EC. A licensing procedure that protects against
specific risks of manufacture or use seems permissible.85
81. OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 15; UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY,
supra note 1, at 18.
82. OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 15; UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY,
supra note 1, at 18.
83. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 17.
84. Id. (the Netherlands draft subsequently became law); see also Rehbinder, supra note 20.
85. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 17.
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Chemical licensing procedures are not common in the industrialized countries. The broadest attempt to introduce premarket control
of chemicals is based on the idea that notification suffices to protect
humans and the environment. This is particularly true for the Member States of the EC, and also for the EFTA countries and the United
States. The EC Member States have implemented the Sixth Amendment differently. This could significantly impact European integration.86 From an international perspective, however, it is much more
important to stress the relative harmony among most industrialized
countries with respect to the necessary limitation of premarket notification procedures.
The history of the international harmonization of chemical regulation illuminates the incentives for the development of an international
model of chemicals control. Since the early 1970s, a number of industrialized countries have discussed the necessity of adopting chemical
regulations. France set the European legislative machinery into motion by notifying the Community of its intentions to adopt chemical
legislation.8 7 Across the Atlantic, the United States was already in the
process of preparing specific chemical-related legislation." These initiatives were pooled by the OECD. The OECD and the European
Community, both international organizations grouping highly industrialized countries, initiated an intensive period of cooperation to guarantee a harmonized approach to regulation among their members to
prevent the emergence of new, technical trade barriers. These OECD
and EC initiatives were quite successful. There is no evidence that the
remaining disparities between EC and U.S. chemical control regulations have led to international trade problems.
Despite the similarities among the legislative efforts of industrialized countries to control chemicals, those similarities do not override a
number of important differences. 89 In the United States, manufacturers have to notify the competent agencies before manufacturing a new
chemical. 90 Under the Sixth Amendment, notification is only necessary before marketing a new chemical. 9' This difference is important
in deciding the extent to which Member States are allowed to introduce licensing procedures related to the manufacture and use of specific highly dangerous chemical substances. The difference between
86.
87.
88.
89.

See Rehbinder, supra note 20.
Wilkinson, supra note 78, at 471.
Id. at 473, 486.
See id. at 486; Wyman, supra note 78, at 442-43.

90. TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (1988).
91. Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, art. 6(1), at 13.
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premanufacturing and premarketing notification is even more important for determining under which conditions chemicals that have not
been notified to the authorities might be exported to countries outside
either the European Community or the United States. Premanufacturing notification excludes such an opportunity. Premarketing notification allows manufacturers to produce chemicals without notifying
the competent authorities if they are able to demonstrate that these
chemicals have been produced for export only.
Other difficulties in the negotiations between the OECD and the
EC resulted from the differences in the notice procedures of the United
States and the EC. 92 Section 5 of the TSCA requires premanufacturing notice and testing for new substances and substances that are subject to significant "new uses."' 93 The Sixth Amendment requires
elaborate notification documents, including testing results. 94 Unlike
TSCA section 5, which confers no competence on the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to compel manufacturers to conduct testing, the Sixth Amendment establishes a mandatory testing scheme for
all new chemicals. 95 In the European Community, responsibility rests
upon the manufacturer to judge the possible risk of the notified chemical; in the United States, responsibility lies with the EPA to review the
notice and request additional information necessary for risk assessment. 96 The differences between mandatory testing combined with the
manufacturers' responsibility to assess the results as opposed to mere
paper notice in conjunction with a statutory risk assessment had led to
a situation where testing disparities became a crucial area of concern
in the dialogue between the OECD and the EC.
The Sixth Amendment advocated a unique mandatory test screening, valid for all types of chemicals. The U.S. approach focused on the
possible toxicity of the product.97 The differences in the test philosophy reflect the differences in risk assessment. The EC has a quantitytriggering mechanism that subjects chemicals to a basic test supplemented by additional testing if more than a certain quantity is produced. The U.S. risk assessment procedure was less rigid and less
predictable because it focused on the toxicity of the chemical sub92. Wilkinson, supra note 78, at 489; Wyman, supra note 78, at 442-57.
93. TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (1988).
94. Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, art. 6(1), at 13.
95. Compare TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1988) with Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, art.
6, at 13; see also Wilkinson, supra note 78, at 489.
96. Compare Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, art. 6(1), at 13 with TSCA 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2603(a), 2604(b) (1988); see also Wilkinson, supra note 78, at 495-97.
97. Wilkinson, supra note 78, at 491-92.
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stances alone. 98
Here the OECD stepped in and tried to develop a common testing
framework. Two recommendations, the Guidelines for Testing of
Chemicals9 9 and the Good Laboratory Practice in the Testing of
Chemicals,10° both adopted in 1982, have been of considerable importance in bringing together the different approaches. The Guidelines
for Testing of Chemicals establishes a minimum set of tests, making
European mandatory testing compatible with U.S. optional testing in
the case of presumed toxicity.
The EPA used the OECD as an international forum to push the
development of minimum testing requirements, although it had no
competence under TSCA to adopt such minimum mandatory standards for testing. 10 1 U.S. manufacturers, contemplating the need to
defend themselves in future lawsuits under the TSCA, wanted a clear
administrative record for TSCA regulations. Therefore, the EPA
acted cautiously in its negotiations with the EC and kept careful
records of all meetings.' 0 2 European manufacturers, on the other
hand, had to accept common Guidelines on Good Laboratory Practice
in the Testing of Chemicals. In their national legislation most of the
EC Member States refer, in one form or another, to the OECD Guidelines.103 The Guidelines are not directly integrated into the laws and
are not mandatory in strictly legal terms, but they play a major role in
present practice.
No equivalent premarket control legislation exists on the international floor. The Ad Hoc Meeting of Senior Government Official Experts in Environmental Law, Montevideo 1982, adopted a program for
the development and periodic review of environmental law. 1°4 It concluded that international trade in potentially harmful chemicals calls
for action, but this mandate has not yet been realized.
3. Pesticides
By authority of either special pesticide laws or general chemical
98. Id.
99. OECD, GUIDELINES FOR TESTING OF CHEMICALS (1982).
100. OECD, GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICE IN THE TESTING OF CHEMICALS (1982).

101. For a detailed presentation of the OECD policy, see remarks of M.C. Bracken in International Regulation of Toxic Substances (panel discussion), supra note 78, at 88; see also BRICKMAN, supra note 78, at 298 (discussing the EPA's role in OECD negotiations).
102. Wilkinson, supra note 78, at 489-90.
103. Rehbinder, supra note 20.
104. Montevideo Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental
Law, Ad Hoc Meeting of Senior Government Officials Expert in Environmental Law, Montevideo, 6 November 1981; UNEP Governing Council, Decision 10/21 (May 31, 1982).
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laws, most industrialized countries require that a pesticide be registered prior to market entry.10 The registration procedure is essentially a substance-related licensing procedure. Many countries,
including Denmark, France, Germany, and Switzerland, call it a
"prior approval procedure," thereby underscoring that pesticides can
be marketed only if the competent authority has positively approved
their safety.10 6 The same type of prior approval procedure is commonly used for medicines.10 7 Therefore, one who intends to manufacture and market a new pesticide must perform a series of tests and
present the results to the appropriate competent agencies. The manufacturer must also initiate, if necessary, additional testing and decide
whether, under what conditions, and for what purpose the pesticide
might be put on the market.108
The normal prerequisites for pesticide approval are sufficient effectiveness, suitability, and safety for humans, animals, and the environment (Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United States).1°9 The integration of environmental protection into the licensing procedure is relatively new, and
the main objective is still to protect humans rather than the environment. Countries tend to use a two-pronged approach, ranking the
protection of the environment behind human health and safety. Sometimes there are additional prerequisites related to the producer or to
methods of production. In the United Kingdom, the same kind of
assessment is made under a voluntary joint industry-government certification scheme, the Pesticide Safety Precautions Scheme. 0 This voluntary arrangement preceded the 1968 introduction of prior approval
procedures in the former Federal Republic of Germany. In 1986,
however, the United Kingdom joined the majority of the industrialized countries and inserted a prior approval procedure in its pesticide
legislation.
At the European level, premarket control of pesticides has never
reached the same degree of public and political attention as premarket
105. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 18. For a comparative analysis, see
KLAUS BOSSELMANN, RECHT DER GEFAHRSTOFFE: RECHTSVERGLEICHENDER UBERBLICK
(1987); Charlotte Uram, InternationalRegulation of the Sale and Use of Pesticides, 10 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & BUs. 460, 463, 467 (1990); see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
106. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 18.
107. For a recent analysis of medicine regulation in the European context, see D. HART & N.
REICH, INTEGRATION UND RECHT DES ARZNEIMITTELMARKETS IN DER EG (ZERP
Schriftenreihe, Band 13, 1990); for an analysis of the situation in a third world country, see G.
MATUSCH, DRUG SAFETY IN KENYA (ZERP-Dicussion Paper, Band 6, 1991).
108. See UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 18-19.
109. Id. at 18.
110. Id.
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control of chemicals. In 1976 the Commission of the European Community presented a proposal for the establishment of a European prior
approval procedure."' The draft was meant to supplement Directive
78/631112 on the classification, labeling, and packaging of pesticides,
but it was not supported by the Council. The White Paper on the
Completion of the Internal Market by 1992 gave a new impetus to the
harmonization of premarket control in the European Community." 3
In 1991 the Commission adopted a new, completely revised system." 4 It provides for a two-tier control that distinguishes between
the registration of active substances and the prior approval of preparations." 5 Prior approval of preparations (pesticides) should be left to
the Member States. The Member States, however, can approve only
those preparations whose active substances appear in annex 1. 116 Article 5 states that an active substance shall be included in annex I for an
initial period not exceeding ten years only if
(a) their residues,. consequent on application consistent with good plant
protection practice, do not have any harmful effects on human or animal
health or on groundwater or any unacceptable influence on the environment, and the said residues, in so far as they are of toxicological or environmental significance, can be measured by methods in general use;
(b) their use, consequent on application consistent with good plant protection practice, does not have any harmful effects on human or animal
health or any anacceptable [sic] influence on the environment as provided for in Article 4(1)(b)(iv) and (v). "1
The directive does not currently contain a list of active substances.
It should be compiled later by the Standing Committee on Plant
Health. Prior approval of preparations by the Member States requires
both a listing of the active substances at the Community level and all
of the following:
(b) it is established, in the light of current scientific and technical kowledge [sic] and shown from appraisal of the dossier provided for in Annex
III, that when used in accordance with Article 3(3), and having regard
to all normal conditions under which it may be used, and to the consequences of its use:
(i) it is sufficiently effective;
(ii) it has no unacceptable effect on plants or plant products;
I 11. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Placing of EEC-accepted
Plant Protection Products on the Market, art. 3, 1976 O.J. (C 212) 3, 5.
112. Council Directive 78/631, supra note 45.
113. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European
Council, COM(85)310 final.
114. Council Directive 91/414, supra note 24.
115. Id. arts. 3, 4, at 4-5.

116. Id. art. 4(l)(a), at 4.
117. Id. art. 5(1), at 6.

Spring 1992]

Chemicals and Pesticides

(iii) it does not cause unnecessary suffering and pain to vertebrates
to be controlled;
(iv) it has no harmful effect on human or animal health, directly or
indirectly (e.g. through drinking water, food or feed) or on
groundwater;
(v) it has no unacceptable influence on the environment, having
particular regard to the following considerations:
- its fate and distribution in the environment, particularly contamination of water including drinking water and
groundwater,
- its impact on non-target species;
(c) the nature and quantity of its active substances and, where appropriate, any toxicologically or ecotoxicologically significant impurities and
co-formulants can be determined by appropriate methods, harmonized
according to the procedure in Article 21, or, if not, agreed by the authorities responsible for the authorization;
(d) its residues, resulting from authorized uses, and which are of toxicological or environmental significance, can be determined by appropriate
methods in general use;
(e) its physical and chemical properties have been determined and
deemed acceptable for purposes of the appropriate use and storage of the
product. 11
Once a pesticide is registered by a Member State, all the other
States would have to allow it to be marketed. A harmonized Community procedure for national registration is lacking. Again, a future definition of this procedure is left to the Standing Committee of Plant
Health.
The draft of the above directive was much criticized by Member
States with higher levels of protection, as well as by environmental
activists.' 1 9 It was said to promote the free flow of pesticides and to
ignore the necessity of effective environmental protection. 20 The prerequisites for authorizing preparations and for listing active substances
require that there be no "unacceptable influence on the environment."' 2 ' These standards have been accused of falling behind the
existing standards of industrialized countries where mere effects on the
environment, not only "harmful" or "unacceptable" effects, have to be
considered in the risk assessment. 22 Another point of criticism was
the lack of clear criteria for the listing of the active substances and the
prior approval of preparations. That task was again left to a Commit118. Id. art. 4(1)(a)-(e), at 4-5.
119. 4 PAN EUROPE NEWSLE-rrER, Dec. 1989, at 21-27.

120. Id.
121. Council Directive 91/414, supra note 24, arts. 4(l)(b)(v) & 5(l)(a), at 4-5, 6.
122. Eckard Rehbinder, Einfuhrung, in BREMER KOLLOQUIUM OBER PFLANZENSCHUTZ,
supra note 11, at 3.
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tee without any parliamentary or public control. Annexes II and III
of the current directive attempt to remedy this problem. 23 If a Member State has authorized a plant protection product, other Member
States cannot prevent the production, storage, and movement of that
product. However, Council Directive 91/414 allows Member States
to prevent the marketing and use of products that they have not authorized. Pesticides already banned in some Member States cannot
return to the markets of those States.1 24 The extensive involvement of
FAO in developing common registration standards might contribute
to harmonizing the registration procedure in the European
Community.
Under the heading "Reducing Health Hazards," article 5 of the
FAO Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides requires governments that have not yet done so to "implement a pesticide registration and control scheme." 1 25 Article 6 states:
Governments should take action to introduce the necessary legislation
for the regulation, including registration, of pesticides, and make provisions for its effective enforcement, including the establishment of appropriate educational advisory, extension and health-care services. The
Guidelines for the registration and control of pesticides should be followed as far as possible, taking full account of local needs, social and
economic conditions, levels of literacy, climatic
conditions and the availability of pesticide application equipment. 126
The FAO Code f6rmulates the background conditions of
premarket control rather than the procedure itself. The latter is
spelled out in the FAO Guidelines on the Registration and Control of
Pesticides. 27 The Code itself grants autonomy to States to decide on
the criteria for admitting pesticides to their markets. Reference is
made to differences in climate, differences in economic resources, and,
implicitly, differences in the possibility of securing the safety of those
28
who apply the pesticides.1
The Guidelines for the Registration and Control of Pesticides is
designed to be a model registration procedure. This scheme turned
out to be too sophisticated for countries lacking the necessary infra123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Council Directive 91/414, supra note 24, annexes II-III,
at 15-32.
Id. art. 3, at 4.
FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 7, art. 5.
Id. art. 6.
FAO, GUIDELINES FOR THE REGISTRATION AND CONTROL OF PESTICIDES

(INCLUD-

ING A MODEL SCHEME FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS) (1985);
FAO, ADDENDA TO THE GUIDELINES FOR THE REGISTRATION AND CONTROL OF PESTICIDES

(1988).
128. The Code has been blamed for not adequately addressing the problem of industry
double standards. GOLDENMAN & RENGAM, supra note 74, at 20-22.
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structure. Therefore, FAO is preparing Guidelines on the Initial Introduction of a Simple National Pesticide Registration and Control
Scheme. Testing requirements are stated in the Guidelines on Environmental Criteria for the Registration of Pesticides, 129 presently
under revision. The Guidelines on Good Laboratory Practices define
minimum testing standards.1 30 There are ten other guidelines already
published, under revision, or under consideration leading to the conclusion that the FAO fulfills the same role in the development of common testing rules for international trade in pesticides as the OECD
does in the international regulation of chemicals. Industrialized countries have pooled their interests in chemical regulation within the
OECD, a forum to which Third World countries have no access.
FAO is open to all States. Developing countries may bring their influence to bear, but FAO is primarily an organization dealing with food
and agriculture and not with health, safety, or environmental protection. In the 1970s, however, it seriously began to consider these objectives. This might explain why the FAO is seen as the appropriate
forum for international coordination and cooperation.
D. Postmarket Control of "Old" Substances and "Old" Pesticides
Postmarket control mechanisms cover two different areas of concern. First, regulatory mechanisms have to be found for the handling
of risks from chemicals and pesticides brought into circulation before
premarket control legislation was adopted. Second, measures are
needed to withdraw from the market, or even to ban the production
of, products that legally entered circulation under previous premarket
control mechanisms but that later turned out to be dangerous. Currently, when there is no common denominator on premarket control
mechanisms of pesticides and chemicals in sight, it might sound
strange to emphasize postmarket control mechanisms at the international level. Public attention, however, is increasingly focused on
chemicals and pesticides that are legally manufactured and marketed
all over the world, but that nevertheless constitute risks. The lesson to
be learned is that premarket controls cannot guarantee that long-term
hazards will not emerge.
1. Concept of Postmarket Control
Postmarket control of old chemicals and old pesticides uses a
129. FAO, GUIDELINES ON ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERIA FOR THE REGISTRATION OF PESTICIDES (1985).

130. FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 7, at 37 n.4 (explicitly referring to the OECD Guidelines prepared for the testing of chemicals but then expanded to pesticides).
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three-step procedure. A competent regulatory authority must first
make safety an acceptable reason for engaging in postmarket control.
It then has to investigate the dangers arising from the questioned
chemicals and pesticides. Finally, it must decide what action to take.
Although regulations in distinguishing more and more sophisticated
degrees of danger often create more problems than they pretend to
solve, there seems to be a commonly accepted difference in premarket
and postmarket control of chemicals and pesticides. Premarket control relates to potential hazards; postmarket control relates to suspected and known risks.' 3 ' Defining the risk is the starting point for
investigating the danger. Regulatory bodies can only take postmarket
control action if they get the necessary information on risks to humans
and the environment. Once the information is available, the authorities enter the decision-making process. Modem chemical and pesticide laws provide several regulatory instruments to fight possible
dangers. 132
Although postmarket control in industrialized countries is a relatively new regulatory field, some common trends are already clear.
There is a tendency to confer responsibility for postmarket control
mechanisms on the statutorily competent authorities that are already
responsible for premarket control. These authorities have thereby
gained substantial power. They benefit from the uncertainties in defining risks, from comprehensive mandates in investigating dangers, and
133
from discretion in taking the appropriate measures.
This tendency might be somewhat counterbalanced by splitting
competencies. Industrialized countries tend to establish separate authorities for each category of products - one agency for chemicals,
another for pesticides. When competence for multiple products is
brought under the same umbrella organization, separate divisions on
chemicals and pesticides are usually set up, as in the case of the EPA.
There is an important difference in the regulatory philosophies of
European and U.S. authorities. It has been noted that
although U.S. and European governments have addressed the problem of
chemical control at roughly the same times and have assumed similar
responsibilities, they have developed markedly different procedures for
reaching regulatory decisions. Two distinct patterns emerge. American
regulatory processes stand apart in the complexity of their procedures,
the heavy reliance on formal analysis of risks and benefits, the openness
of administrative decision making, and the active supervision of executive agencies by Congress and the courts. European processes, despite
131. OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 9-14.
132. Id. tbl. 4, at 21.

133. Majone, supra note 40, at 97-98.
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some notable differences among them, share simpler administrative procedures, greater informality in the analysis of evidence, less complete
public access to decision makers, and relatively little oversight by parliament or the courts. Yet one of our most intriguing conclusions is that
these contrasting methods of decision making have led to remarkably
similar policy choices, particularly
in the selection of specific chemicals
134
as targets of regulation.
Access to information plays a key role in postmarket control. The
1980s demonstrated the growing power of national and international
nongovernmental organizations to bring the risks of chemicals and
pesticides to the public's attention and to push regulatory agencies
into action. Effective postmarket control requires the early public dissemination of information on even potential risks of chemicals and
pesticides. Access to information, however, has to be weighed against
the legitimate intellectual property interests of manufacturers in protecting data on chemicals and pesticides. The industrialized countries
have not yet arrived at a common solution. The TSCA obliges chemical manufacturers to make publicly available all data about their products related to health, safety, and environmental protection. The Sixth
Amendment chose a much more restrictive approach. Data are not
made available to the public because manufacturers may require confidentiality.1 35 The OECD has tried to harmonize differences between
the United States and the European Community. Two guidelines on
the confidentiality of data protection have been developed. The extent
to which European and U.S. manufacturers have harmonized their
differences has never been investigated. As far as is currently known,
problems have not arisen, but mainly European manufacturers have
feared the liberal U.S. approach to data protection. Even EC policy
has changed, as indicated by the newly adopted Directive on Freedom
136
of Access to Information.
Whatever solutions are found among the industrialized countries
to balance the conflicting interests of the public in having early access
to information about potential hazards of chemicals and pesticides and
of manufacturers to protect these data, there is much pressure on international and nongovernmental organizations, watchdogs of the international trade in chemicals and pesticides, to establish their own
134. BRICKMAN, supra note 78, at 23.

135. Wilkinson, supra note 78, at 483. For a more comprehensive treatment, see Wyman,
supra note 78, at 451-52.
136. Council Directive 90/313 of 7 June 1990 on the Freedom of Access to Information on
the Environment, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 56; GERD WINTER, OFFENTLICHKEIT VON UMWELTINFORMATIONEN:

(1990).

EUROPAISCHE UND NORDAMERIKANISCHE RECHTE UND ERFAHRUNGEN
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data collection systems.1 37 These systems, however, can never reach
the same level and quality as the systems erected in the multinational
enterprises or in the competent authorities of the main chemical- and
pesticide-producing countries. International information systems that
do not distinguish between confidential and nonconfidential data on
potential risks of chemicals and pesticides and that guarantee access to
information run the risk of stocking only the "second best" data.
2.

Information Collection and Information Exchange

At the national level, highly sophisticated regulatory systems have
been developed in the EC, the EFTA countries, and the United States.
Despite considerable differences in detail, there seems to be an inverse
relationship between the quality of premarket control and that of
postmarket control. In other words, in countries with a well-developed system of premarket control of pesticides, as in Germany,
postmarket control is less developed. Quite the opposite is true for
technical consumer goods. These goods are usually not subject to any
kind of statutory premarket control, but highly sophisticated systems
exist to withdraw unsafe technical consumer goods from the market. 138 Well developed data collection is based on accident surveillance systems; on the notification duties of manufacturers, suppliers,
and importers; and on mechanisms to guarantee that informal information from individuals or organizations is dealt with appropriately.
The overall intention of these mechanisms is to guarantee that competent authorities are brought into a position where they can assess the
reported risks with respect to the legal requirements.
At the EC level, a sophisticated system of information collection
and information exchange is operating only in the area of technical
consumer goods. Here, the so-called Rapid Exchange System, Council Regulation 84/133, requires the reporting of formal and informal
regulatory actions of Member State authorities to the Commission,
which guarantees the exchange of information with all the other Member States.1 39 The Draft Directive on Product Safety 90/C 156/07
even tries to establish a mechanism under which the Commission itself
137. Y. Domzalski, Les Interpols des Associations de Consommateurs, BEUC/1 13/84 (1984).
138. See CHRISTIAN JOERGES ET AL., DIE SICHERHEIT VON KONSUMERGUTERN

UND DIE

ENTWICKLUNG DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFEN (ZERP Schriftenreihe, Band 2, 1988)
for a comprehensive analysis of consumer product safety legislation in the European
Community.
139. Council Decision 84/113 of 2 March 1984 Introducing a Community System for the
Rapid Exchange of Information on Dangers Arising from the Use of Consumer Products, 1984
O.J. (L 70) 16, as amended 1989 O.J. (L17) 51, and 1990 O.J. (L 173) 49. For a critical review,
see Josef Falke, What Should be the Content of an E.E.C. General Directive on the Safety of
Technical Consumer Goods, BEUC LEGAL NEws, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 16.
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is able to take action at the Community level in emergency

situations. 140
There is no EC equivalent for controlling chemicals and pesticides.
There is no mechanism obliging Member States to exchange information with the Commission or with the other Member States on possible
risks from unsafe chemicals or pesticides. Presently, the consultative
committees, composed of representatives of Member States and the
Commission and constituted under the respective directives, guarantee
that an informal exchange of information can take place. However,
these committees are working behind closed doors; neither public interest groups nor manufacturers have been officially granted access.
Also, the committees themselves are under no duty to report on their

activities. 14t
The situation is different when Member States want to prohibit or
restrict the marketing of chemicals or pesticides that comply with accepted European standards. Here, the directives provide a safeguard
procedure under which Member States must notify the Commission of
their intentions. The Commission, in turn, then initiates a procedure
to find a common position at the European level.' 42 However, there is
no legal obligation to come to a joint solution. The Community has no
power to take action if one Member State legitimately prohibits the
import of certain unsafe chemicals or pesticides for heath, safety, and
environmental protection reasons. This mechanism, established under
43
the Sixth Amendment, is used in Directive 91/414 on pesticides.t
Information collection and exchange about possible risks from
dangerous pesticides and chemicals and about regulatory actions taken
by States to mitigate these risks constitute two of the predominant
areas of concern for international organizations. 44 U.N. organizations concentrate their toxic chemical efforts on the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information on chemical risks. The
environmental health criteria program, for example, compiles and
analyzes the available information on the health effects of a limited
140. Commission Amended Proposal 90/C 156/07 of 11 June 1990 for a Council Directive
Concerning General Product Safety, arts. 8-11, 1990 O.J. (C 156) 8, 12-13; see also Josef Falke,
Elements ofa Horizontal Product Safety Policy for the European Community, 12 J. CONSUMER
POL'Y 207 (1989); Stephen Weatherill, A General Duty to Supply Only Safe Goods in the Community, Some Remarks from a British Perspective, 13 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 79 (1990).
141. H. Bentlage, An Advisory Board for Consumer Product Safety. The German Experience
-

European Perspectives, in STUDIE IM AUFTRAG DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN

(ZERP Vertrags-Nummer 6674/89/15, 1990).
142. The safeguard procedure is not specific to a particular directive. It is a widely spread
mechanism to cope with differing regulatory actions of Member States to fight unsafe products.
143. Council Directive 91/414, supra note 24, art. 11, at 9.
144. See BRICKMAN, supra note 78, at 291.
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number of selected pollutants. These evaluations are published in a
series of reports, some of which even conclude with regulatory recommendations. WHO has established a similar program on work place
hazards.

45

Several U.N. programs focus more on dissemination of information than on evaluation. The International Register of Potentially
Toxic Chemicals is charged with developing an international data
bank on toxic chemicals, particularly common agrochemicals. ILO
publishes bibliographies and an encyclopedia of occupational health
and safety, both of which contain information on chemical hazards.
The International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS), an effort
cosponsored by WHO, ILO, and UNEP, has been established to register national institutions and support agencies in a coordinated program of new research on specific hazards.
In contrast to the EC, or even the OECD, programs, the efforts of
the U.N. organizations in the area of toxic substance control seem
rather fragmented, even duplicative. They try to achieve, however,
what is undoubtedly their principal purpose and value: to render service to those countries that lack an indigenous capability to compile
such information and to evaluate the world literature on chemical
hazards. In fulfilling these functions, the U.N. agencies help extend
the benefits of scientific information and increased sophistication in
controlling risks to the less advantaged regions of the world. 146
After information on toxic chemical risks has been collected,
mechanisms have to be established to promote collective regulatory
action. This is where international organizations have become involved and have demonstrated their willingness to play a key role.
The emergence of information collection and exchange in the field of
regulatory action restricting or banning chemicals and pesticides is
closely related to the discussion of international efforts to regulate the
export and import of severely restricted and banned chemicals and
pesticides.

47

The OECD is playing a leading role in the management of risks
from old chemicals and pesticides that were originally produced and
marketed long before mechanisms of premarket control were developed. The OECD, supported by the main chemical-producing countries, is trying to develop a program for dealing with old chemicals and
145. For a comparative overview, see OECD, REPORT OF THE EXPERT GROUP ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE RELATED TO EXPORT OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS (1982).

146.

BRICKMAN,

supra note 78, at 291.

147. See supra Part II(E).
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pesticides. 148 Currently, there is no common methodology for selecting old substances. Different criteria, resulting from the divergent experiences of the key authorities of the various States, are under
discussion. For instance, the German Federal Environmental Agency,
composed of representatives from the chemical industry, government
agencies, and science, advocates a multistep procedure. From the
original list of 4,554 substances, only sixty remain to be further examined. The parallel to the late 1970s, when the introduction of
premarket control mechanisms on chemicals was discussed in Europe
and in the United States, is striking. Once more, it may be necessary
to find a common denominator in order to evaluate over 100,000
chemical substances and to decide which require the highest degree of
public attention. 14 9 A recent EC initiative that translates the OECD
50
program into EC legislation seems to be a first step in that direction.1
3. Rules to Ban or Restrict the Production, Marketing, and Use of
Unsafe Chemicals and Pesticides
Deciding to ban or restrict unsafe chemicals and pesticides entails
a complicated procedure of balancing interests. This procedure takes
place at the national level. Each State defines the instruments and
chooses the regulatory form under which the action is taken. In Germany and Japan, partial bans or restrictions of chemicals are accomplished by regulation. Most States delegate the authority to ban or
restrict the marketing and use of unsafe chemicals and pesticides to
the agency in charge of premarket control.151
There are considerable differences in-the instruments on which action can be based. The OECD Report gives an overview using a set of
tables that link the trigger mechanism to the selection of control action. 5 2 It should be noted, however, that most of the industrialized
countries provide not only for- the possibility of restricting or banning
the marketing of unsafe chemicals but also for intervening in the production process itself and prohibiting the manufacture of dangerous
148. James E. Brydon et al., OECD's Work on Investigation of High Production Volume
Chemicals, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 263 (June 13, 1990).
149. Id. at 263-64.
150. Commission Proposal 90/C 276/01 of 5 October 1990 for a Council Regulation (EEC)
on the Evaluation and the Control of the Environmental Risks of Existing Substances, 1990 O.J.
(C 276) 1; Hans-W. Micklitz, Organisational Structures of Product Safety Regulation, in LA
StCURITt DES BIENS DE CONSOMMATION, INTfORATION EUROP.ENNE ET CONSOMMATION
SUISSE (B. Stauder ed.) (describing and analyzing premarket and postmarket regulation in the

field of product safety) [hereinafter Organisational Structures].
151. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 15.
152. See OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, tbls. 2, 3, 4, 5, at 13, 16, 21-22.
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chemicals. 153
EC Member States remain responsible for restricting or banning
the manufacture, use, and marketing of unsafe chemicals and pesticides. There is not yet an agreement, even with a view toward the
Internal Market, regarding postmarket control at the European level.
The directives to ban and restrict unsafe chemicals, Directive 76/
769,154 and to regulate unsafe pesticides, Directive 79/117,55 provide
a regulatory framework that may be regarded as a starting point for
European postmarket control management. A ban or restriction,
however, entails setting the complicated and lengthy agreement procedure of the Community into motion. The Council, the legislative organ, rather than the Commission, the executive organ, must make the
necessary decision. Agreements are often reached at the lowest common denominator and resulting measures are adopted only after considerable delay. It is not surprising that there is little harmony within
the Community regarding which particular chemicals and pesticides
are to be restricted or banned.1 56 The example of pentachlorophenol
illustrates the difficulties; the former Federal Republic of Germany decided to ban pentachlorophenol after informing the Commission and
57
waiting more than one year for a joint approach. 1
At the international level, banning or restricting the production,
use, and marketing of unsafe chemicals and pesticides requires an
agreement in the competent international organization(s) to either issue a recommendation or develop a binding convention. There are
only a few examples thus far where a worldwide agreement is being
considered to regulate unsafe chemicals and pesticides. Reference can
be made to the OECD recommendation to ban PCB 58 and the most
recent Montreal Protocol to reduce the production of chemicals that
deplete the ozone layer.1 59
International organizations have to develop more flexible systems
to compensate for their lack of regulatory competence. One well153. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 15.
154. Council Directive 76/769 of 27 July 1976 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Procedures of the Member States Relating to Restrictions on the Marketing and Use of Certain Dangerous Substances and Preparations, 1976 O.J. (L 262) 201.
155. Council Directive 79/117 of 21 December 1978 Prohibiting the Placing on the Market
and Use of Plant Protection Products Containing Certain Active Substances, 1979 O.J. (L 33) 36.
156. OrganisationalStructures, supra note 150.
157. Pentachlorphenalverbotsverordnung, 1989 Bundesgesetzblatt I 2235.
158. See OECD Council Decision, Protection of the Environment by Control of
Polychlorinated Biphenyls (Feb. 13, 1987). For further details, see OECD, THE OECD CHEMICALS PROGRAMME (1988); Alston, supra note 2, at 423.
159. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, S. TREATY Doc. No.
10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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known but highly controversial mechanism to initiate the worldwide
banning and restricting of unsafe chemicals and pesticides is the adoption of the U.N. Consolidated List, now in its third edition. 16° This
list compiles information about regulatory actions on chemicals and
pesticides in order to show, mainly to developing countries, the type of
actions taken by the industrialized countries to combat unsafe chemicals and pesticides. The Consolidated List is not legally binding, but it
may have a moral impact in that the products on the list are stigmatized and consequently more difficult to market worldwide. The list
may affect regulatory action in developing countries. It also may become instrumental for nongovernmental organizations in their fight
against trade in pesticides and chemicals that pose a well known risk
to humans and the environment. An example is the Dirty Dozen
Campaign of the Pesticides Action Network (PAN).
E. Regulation of the Export and Import of Banned and Severely
Restricted Chemicals and Pesticides
There are a number of national and international rules on the export and import of banned and severely restricted chemicals and pesticides that merit consideration. From a national perspective, efforts by
the United States, mainly during the late 1970s and early 1980s, to
16 1
regulate the export of pesticides and chemicals must be mentioned.
From a regional perspective, reference should be made to Council
Regulation 1734/88 concerning the export and import of certain dangerous chemicals.' 62 However, national and regional efforts lag behind the overwhelming interest of international organizations in
advocating harmonized regulation on the export and import of banned
160. For

further

analysis,

see

HANS-W.

MICKLITZ,

EXPORT

OF

DANGEROUS

PHARMACEUTICALS TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES (ZERP-Discussion Papers, 1987).

161. For the leading article on this subject, see Francine Schulberg, United States Export of
Products Banned for Domestic Use, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 331 (1979). For an international perspective, see Lothar Gundling, PriorNotification and Consultation,in TRANSFERRING HAZARDOUS TECHNOLOGIES AND SUBSTANCES:

THE INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE 63 (Giinther Handl

& Robert Lutz eds., 1989); Eckard Rehbinder, Export von Schddlingsbekdmpfungsmassnahmen:
Gemeinsame Verantwortung von Export-und Importstaat?, in JAHRBUCH DES UMWELT- UND
TECHNIKRECHTS 337 (UTR Band 5, 1988); Marc Pallemaerts, Diplomacy and Double Standards: The Regulation of International Trade in Pesticides (1985) (unpublished Masters thesis,
Harvard Law School).
162. Council Regulation 1734/88 of 16 June 1988 Concerning Export From and Import Into
the Community of Certain Dangerous Chemicals, 1988 O.J. (L 155) 2. The Commission has
proposed an amended version of this regulation. The amended version would incorporate a prior
informed consent procedure. Commission Proposal 91/C 17/20 of 20 December 1990 for a
Council Regulation Concerning Export and Import of Certain Dangerous Chemicals, 1991 O.J.
(C 17) 16; see also Marc Pallemaerts, Export Notification: The EC Approach in the International
Context, EUR. ENV'T REV., Feb. 1987, at 25 (discussing the draft proposal for the above-cited
regulation).
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and severely restricted chemicals and pesticides. Among the most notable efforts are:
- OECD Recommendation C (84) 37 Information Exchange Related
to Export of Banned or Severely Restricted Chemicals (1984);
- OECD Guiding Principles on Information Exchange Related to Export of Banned or Severely Restricted Chemicals (1984);
UNEP Amended London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade (1989);
- FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of
Pesticides (1989);
UNEP Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989).
1. Concept, Definition, and Role of International Organizations
The export and import of banned and severely restricted chemicals
and pesticides has become an international issue. The first initiative to
develop international rules, notably undertaken by the OECD, derived
from the U.S. policy of the late 1970s and early 1980s to regulate exports and imports from a human rights perspective.1 63 However, national efforts to control exports and imports have slackened and have
been replaced by attempts by different international organizations to
find a harmonized procedure. The different regulatory approaches of
the industrialized nations toward exports of banned and severely restricted chemicals and pesticides are seen as a technical barrier to
trade requiring an international process of harmonization. The interest in and impact of such an international understanding, however, is
limited.
The original plan to harmonize export/import rules worldwide involved merely bridging the gaps between the differences in the various
national efforts to protect their citizens and the environment against
risks resulting from pesticides and chemicals. Nevertheless, the differences that continue even among industrialized nations lead to a situation in which one industrialized country bans or restricts certain
pesticides or chemicals while another allows their continued production and marketing. 164
The main impetus for an international rule, however, is not the
differences among industrialized nations. Developing countries, the
primary recipients of exports of banned and severely restricted chemicals and pesticides, complained in the late 1970s that there was no
163. See generally M.G. Kaladharan Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations and United
States Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 813, 824-31 (1978); Dana J. Jacob, Comment, Hazardous Exports from a Human Rights Perspective, 14 Sw. U. L. REV. 81 (1983).
164. See Schulberg, supra note 161, at 331-33.
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national legislation to protect them from such exports. Therefore, the
overall perspective in the early 1980s was not to harmonize the international rules on the production, use, and marketing of chemicals and
pesticides. Rather, the goal of the 1970s and 1980s was to find international rules bridging the gap between the differences among the extensive chemicals and pesticides regulations of the industrialized
exporting countries and the lack of comparable rules in the importing
,developing countries. One might even conclude that the original intention was not to regulate the trade of banned and severely restricted
chemicals and pesticides but to find rules under which trade in these
incriminated product categories could be legitimated.
In this period, the OECD played a key role in international efforts
to resolve export/import issues. In 1984, the OECD adopted its Recommendation on the Information Exchange Related to Export of
Banned or Severely Restricted Chemicals16 5 and the Guiding Principles. 1 66 For a number of years, a consensus among the OECD States
determined the nature of the discussion in broader forums like UNEP
and FAO. The regulatory model, based on a clear distinction between
information exchange on the one hand and export notification on the
other, has been overcome only in the last few years. Under pressure
from developing countries supported by nongovernmental organizations, the OECD regulatory models were further developed and sup67
plemented by the PIC procedure.'
The PIC procedure represents an important shift in the regulation
of hazardous, not just banned and severely restricted, chemicals and
pesticides. These rules may be the starting point for the development
of international rules on the production, use, and marketing of chemicals and pesticides. This is true for two reasons. First, the PIC procedure establishes a mechanism that guarantees that all actions taken by
countries to restrict or ban chemicals or pesticides can be integrated.
Second, the rules on classification, labeling, and technical assistance
integrated within the UNEP Amended London Guidelines not only
support the scope of the more narrow rules on banned and severely
restricted chemicals and pesticides, but may be understood as an effort
to establish international minimum standards applicable to all chemicals and pesticides. The Basle Convention providing for PIC 168 has
165. OECD, RECOMMENDATION ON THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE RELATED TO EXPORT
OF BANNED OR SEVERELY RESTRICTED CHEMICALS (1984).
166. OECD, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE RELATED TO EXPORT OF
BANNED OR SEVERELY RESTRICTED CHEMICALS (1984).
167. AMENDED LONDON GUIDELINES, supra note 3; FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 7.
168. UNEP, Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, ENVTL. POL'Y & L., Apr. 1989, at 68. For the EC's commitment in imple-
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considerably facilitated the adoption of the Amended London
Guidelines.
This view of the further development of international rules for the
export of banned and severely restricted pesticides and chemicals is
considerably strengthened by the fact that GATT has put the issue in
the Uruguay Round. GATT established notification and information
exchange mechanisms in the early 1980s, an effort initiated by the
strong engagement of the OECD, FAO, and UNEP. GATT felt that
something should be done and entered the field. 169 The discussions
and negotiations on the rules, however, took place within the OECD,
FAO, and UNEP. With the establishment of the Working Group on
Trade of Domestically Prohibited Goods and Other Hazardous Substances, the international scenario has changed dramatically. GATT's
involvement makes it clear that rules are needed at the international
level to integrate the original GATT idea of free trade with the necessity of protection of health, safety, and the environment. GATT's
commitment could well constitute the beginning of the development of
an international regulatory order for product safety and environmental protection.
2.

Information Exchange, Export Notification, and Prior Informed
Consent Procedure

The OECD Recommendation on Information Exchange and the
Guiding Principles, both adopted in 1984, have introduced a two-tier
procedure. 170 This procedure remains valid and is used worldwide.
The procedure is based on the distinction between the exchange of
information on regulatory action and the notification of an export
once it occurs. Information exchange simply means that States that
have taken action to ban or severely restrict a chemical or pesticide are
to notify the other members of the relevant international organizations. Such information exchange should guarantee that the other
members are kept abreast of the actions taken within the network.
The establishment of an information exchange mechanism involves defining the types of action that require notification:
menting the Convention, see Commission Proposal 90/C 289/05 of 10 October 1990 for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the Supervision and Control of Shipments of Waste Within, Into and
Out Of the European Community, 1990 O.J. (C 289) 9.
169. Eckard Rehbinder, Environmental Protection and the Law of International Trade, in
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT 357 (R.J. Dupuy ed.,
1985) (with particular reference to the export of hazardous chemicals and transfrontier disposal

of wastes).
170. RECOMMENDATION ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE, supra note 165; GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE, supra note 166.
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- only final action as promoted by the industrialized countries or already provisional and intermediary actions;
- a definition of what is to be understood by hazardous chemicals, only
banned or severely restricted, or at the same time unregistered or voluntarily withdrawn, chemicals and pesticides;
- last, but not least, it requires the complicated determination of the
7
category "severely restricted."' '1
The OECD Guiding Principles have taken a narrow approach,
covering only final actions and limiting the scope to banned and severely restricted products, excluding both informal activities of manufacturers and never-registered products. This approach determines
the scope of each and every international mechanism currently under
discussion. Information exchange about final regulatory actions on
limited product categories constituted the industrialized States' original offer to guarantee the developing States some minimum protection.
Mere information exchange between designated authorities seemed
quite moderate, but information exchange becomes substantially more
important once an organization compiles and files the information in a
172
separate document like the Consolidated List.
Export notification must be clearly distinguished from mere information exchange about regulatory actions. With export notification,
the exporter notifies the exporting authorities and/or the importing
authorities that the exporter intends to export chemicals or pesticides.
The OECD Guiding Principles originally blocked the efforts of developing countries to use export notification to impede international trade
in chemicals and pesticides. PIC means that the exporter must notify
the planned destination of an intention to export and then wait for the
importing country's consent before shipping the products. Numerous
variations have been discussed within the last few years, ranging from
stop shipment notification to a more flexible approach where only annual notification would be necessary.
There are also various opinions on the appropriate level of government involvement. Developing countries pushed for a model where
exporters would be required to notify statutory authorities in both the
exporting and importing States and where each statutory authority
transmits the notification to the other. In contrast, manufacturers
promoted the idea of organizing export notification between the exporter and the importer and not engaging the statutory authorities of
either State.
The prevailing export notification mechanism, as set out by the
171. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE, supra note 166, at 1094.
172. See Giindling, supra note 161; Pallemaerts, supra note 161.
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OECD Guiding Principles, leaves room for interpretation. The language provides that, if the export of a chemical banned or severely
restricted in the State of export occurs, the State of export should ensure that the necessary steps are taken to provide the designated national authority of the State of import with relevant information.1 73 In
the words of the OECD and the original London Guidelines, the purpose of export notification is "to remind the State of the import of the
original notification regarding control action (information exchange)
74
and to alert it to the fact that an export will occur or is occurring."'
There are some minor differences between the OECD Guiding Principles, the original UNEP Guidelines, and article 9 of the 1985 version
of the FAO Code of Conduct, but whatever these differences are, no
stop-shipment notification, not even notification prior to export, is
mandatory. The roles of exporters and importers and of exporting and
importing authorities are not clearly defined.
Despite this uncertainty, the information exchange and export notification originally promoted by the OECD Guiding Principles have
become part of the national regulatory systems of most industrialized
nations. Provisions of U.S. chemical and pesticide laws and regulations cover information exchange and notification procedures as provided under the OECD Guiding Principles.175 EC Regulation 1734/
t76
88 codifies the OECD, UNEP, and FAO international consensus.
The EC regulation wisely avoids a number of conflicts over its scope
by listing twenty-one chemicals and pesticides that fall within the ambit of the exchange and notification mechanism.177
The PIC procedure in the Amended London Guidelines and in the
FAO Code of Conduct constitutes a considerable step toward a more
sophisticated scheme for the regulation of trade in banned and severely restricted pesticides. The adoption of the PIC procedure is
properly seen as the response of the developing countries to the OECD
States' efforts to impose the agreement on information exchange and
export notification on them. A conflict resulted from the adoption of
the PIC procedures. The industrialized nations defended the OECD
173. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE, supra note 166.
174. AMENDED LONDON GUIDELINES, supra note 3, art. 8(b).

175. See generally Raymond Hill, Problems and Policy for Pesticide Exports to Less Developed
Countries, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 699 (1988) (reviewing U.S. and international policies regulating pesticide exports); Robert E. Lutz, The Export of Danger: A View from the Developed World,
20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 629, 642-69 (1988) (analyzing the extent to which the United
States and other technology producing countries regulate hazardous exports).
176. Council Regulation 1734/88, supra note 162, currently under revision to implement

PIC procedures. Commission Proposal 91/C 17/20, supra note 162, pmbl. & art. 1, at 16-17.
177. Council Regulation 1734/88, supra note 162, art. 2(1)-(2) & Annexes I-I, at 17-18 &
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system as sufficient to deal with banned and severely restricted pesticides while the developing countries advocated a mechanism to guarantee that importing countries are informed of the export of banned
and severely restricted chemicals prior to export. This conflict led to
the development of the red-flag approach.
The red-flag approach is a PIC procedure that centers on the idea
that exporting and importing States can negotiate an alert list. Importing countries must decide whether to accept, accept with restrictions, or reject imports of listed chemicals and pesticides. The red-flag
approach can be described as a "control-action-related PIC procedure," control-action-related because PIC is bound to the control action and not to the concrete export.
Crucial to the operation of the red-flag approach is determining
which products under what conditions should be on the alert list. The
answer is pragmatic. Chemicals that ten or more countries have
banned or severely restricted will be automatically placed on the list.
Those that five or more but less than ten countries have banned or
severely restricted will be subject to an "informal consultative process," to determine whether they meet the London Guidelines and
FAO Code definitions of banned or severely restricted for health or
environmental reasons. 178 Chemicals meeting the definitions will be
placed on the list. This system applies to chemicals subjected to control actions before the implementation of the PIC scheme and will lead
to the establishment of an initial red-flag list.
A different system will apply to chemicals that are banned or severely restricted after the circulation of the initial list. These chemicals will automatically become subject to PIC requirements when even
a single government takes a control action "meeting the definitions of
179
the London Guidelines" and notifies the PIC body of that action.
However, there is "an informal consultative process" to "assist UNEP
and FAO in determining whether the control action meets the definition,"' 18° a process that places discretion with UNEP, FAO secretariats, consulted competent national authorities, and experts. For the
first time, a worldwide mechanism has been established to constantly
review chemicals and pesticides as to whether they should be put on
the red-flag list.
The PIC procedure also confers a key role on IRPTC. IRPTC
must disseminate the control action to all participating countries and
178. AMENDED LONDON GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at annex I(1)(b)(ii).

179. Id. annex II(l)(c).
180. Id. annex 1I(2)-(4).
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verify whether they will accept exports of the controlled substance.' 8'
The introduction of the PIC procedure has redefined the responsibilities of importing and exporting countries. The OECD model vests in
the importing country primary responsibility for deciding what to do
with the information received. The PIC procedure, however, explicitly starts from the concept of shared responsibility between exporting
and importing countries. The Amended London Guidelines clearly
state that "[i]t should be the function of designate national authorities
with regard to export of banned or severely restricted chemicals 'to
implement appropriate procedures, within their authority, designed to
ensure that exports do not occur contrary to the PIC decisions or participating importing countries.' 182 Although the exact meaning of
the reference is far from clear, 8 3 exporting countries have accepted
their responsibility to contribute to the implementation of the
Amended London Guidelines.
3. Classification, Packaging, Labeling, and Technical Assistance
The PIC procedure does not provide explicit classification, packaging, and labeling rules. Rather, it emphasizes fundamental principles.
States should recognize exported chemicals are subject to no less stringent requirements of classification, packaging, and labeling than comparable products designated for domestic use. A similar rule has been
introduced in EC regulation 1734/88.184 However, the Amended
London Guidelines go one step further by asking States, when they
elaborate and implement existing or future harmonized procedures for
the classification, packaging, and labeling of chemicals in international
trade, to consider the special circumstances surrounding the manage85
ment of chemicals in developing countries.
The request to consider the special chemical management
problems of developing countries shows that the implementation of
the PIC procedure, the information exchange, and the notification system is only possible if resources are made available by industrialized
States to build the necessary infrastructure in developing countries.
This request has led national development aid institutions and interna181. Id. annex 1I.
182. Id. art. 12(c)(iv).
183. PaperPresentation, Ad Hoe Working Group of Experts on the Implementation of the
Amended London Guidelines, 1st Sess., UNEP/PIC. WG.3/Inf. (1990) (The topic of this session: Proposals on Draft Model National Legislation on Management of Chemicals for the Implementation of the Amended London Guidelines).
184. Council Regulation 1734/88, supra note 162, art. 5, at 3. The proposed amendment is
found at Commission Proposal 91/C 17/20, supra note 162, art. 6, at 19-20.
185. AMENDED LONDON GUIDELINES, supra note 3, art. 14(b).
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tional organizations to evaluate the incoming data on banned or severely restricted pesticides with the goal of establishing the
prerequisites for import control.'8 6
4.

Regulation of Banned and Severely Restricted Products Within
UNEP, FAO, and the GATT

The existing GATT rules articulate a clear message: any form of
restriction of the export of hazardous chemicals runs counter to the
GATT ideal of free trade. 8 7 As a result, there is no mechanism to
allow GATT Contracting Parties to restrict exports for foreign policy
reasons. However, article XX of the GATT allows an importing
country to impose restrictions if the importing country is convinced
the goods endanger health and the environment. 8 Article XX
presents the problem of distinguishing legitimate interests from protectionist considerations. The GATT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade tries to balance these conflicting interests by asking
signatory States to notify GATT if they wish to restrict the import of
certain products for health, safety, and environmental reasons. 8 9 Unfortunately, GATT has no rules to deal with the problem of deviating
health, safety, and environmental protection standards. This shortcoming might well be the source of GATT's interest in developing its
own rules. 190
II.

DETERMINING FACTORS IN THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
CHEMICAL AND PESTICIDE REGULATION

For international regulation of chemicals and pesticides to develop
further, it is necessary to determine the factors that influence the process of internationalization. This conclusion, therefore, should be read
as a preface to the ongoing debate regarding the feasibility of an international convention on the production and use of chemicals and pesti186. Bangkok, Thailand Workshop on Pesticides Regulatory Principles and Procedures for
the Asian and the Pacific Region, Implementation of the InternationalCode of Conduct on the
Distribution and Use of Pesticides (Technical Assistance Project Financed Through a Trust Fund
Provided by the Government of Japan, 1988).
187. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, art. XI, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 224-28; Michael Rom, Export Controls in GATT, 18 J. WORLD
TRADE

L. 125 (1984).

188. GATT, supra note 187, art. XX, at 262-65.
189. See generally Patrizio Merciai, Safeguard Measures in GA TT, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L.
41(1981).
190. For further details, see John Sankey, Domestically ProhibitedGoods and Hazardous
Substances - A New GATT Working Group is Established,J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1989, at 99.
For a broader view, especially with respect to the relationship between U.S. and EC chemical
regulation and GATT, see remarks of Edmund B. Frost, in InternationalRegulation of Toxic
Substances (panel discussion), supra note 77, at 102; remarks of Robert E. Herzstein, in id. at 92.
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cides, a convention on which UNEP intends to elaborate in the next
few years. This intention has not yet been explicitly voiced, however,
because UNEP fears strong and immediate objections from the industrialized States.1 9 1
A.

Economic and PoliticalIncentives

The most important impetus for the development of international
regulatory mechanisms is the industrialized States' fear that divergent
national standards may lead to new trade barriers. 192 In fact, the desire to prevent trade barriers induced the OECD and EEC to come to
a joint solution on the regulatory framework for the control of chemicals. Similar motivations exist in the area of pesticides. The FAO
Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides seeks to
develop a worldwide regulatory framework to guarantee the free flow
of pesticides.
States have strong incentives to prevent the technical barriers to
trade that result from divergent national control legislation. This does
not mean that health, safety, and environmental policy objectives
should be set aside. They may be pursued alongside the trade policy
objectives. The fear of technical barriers to trade improves the prospects of international regulation of chemicals and pesticides considerably, but, at the same time, it limits the goals that can be achieved.
Health, safety, and environmental protection as such are never the
objectives of regulation. Social protection is subordinate to the overriding goal of the free flow of chemicals and pesticides.
The difference in philosophies becomes clear when one considers
the question of international rules for the protection of health and
safety in the workplace. When such regulation was discussed within
the OECD and the European Community, the two organizations
failed to integrate the protection of health and safety at work and international chemical regulation in a single framework. Ten years
later, the negative effects of differing State standards on the protection
of health and safety at work are indisputable. It is within the context
of the steadily growing importance of differing standards for health
and safety at work that the ILO convention must be seen.
Defensive strategies against unfair imports can easily be combined
191. The Draft Model National Legislation on the Management of Chemicals for the Implementation of the Amended London Guidelines, Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on the Implementation of the Amended London Guidelines, 1st Sess., UNEP/PIC. WG. 3/3 (1990). One
might understand this document as a preparatory document for an international convention.
192. This assumption is underscored by the most recent initiative of the OECD organizing
the workshop held September 17-20, 1991 called Economic Effects of PIC.
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with health, safety, and environmental objectives. In 1974, the United
States introduced rules in its Trade Act providing sanctions against
importing countries that benefit from lower production costs because
of workplace health and safety standards far below those of the United
States. 193 Finland has just adopted a regulation imposing a charge per
1 94
ton on oil delivered to its ports by tankers without double bottoms.
Despite the decisive role of economic incentives, one should not
underestimate the importance political incentives. A striking example
of the power of political incentives is the development of rules on the
regulation of banned and severely restricted pesticides and chemicals,
most notably the adoption of the PIC procedure. Extensive pressure
from different actors has led to a regulatory mechanism that presents
GATT with the challenge of bringing the GATT's free trade philosophy closer to the safety and environmental protection concerns of
UNEP.
B.

The Relationship Between Unilateraland InternationalActions
to Control Pesticides and Chemicals

Unilateral action to control chemicals and pesticides has been necessary to legitimate international action. For example, had the United
States not taken the initiative in the late 1970s, organizations like the
OECD, UNEP, and FAO would have had no incentive to internationalize the export/import issue. Another example is the development of
international rules to control chemicals. Here, the close cooperation
of the United States and Europe through the OECD and the European
Community underscores the necessity of developing genuine international rules that are adapted not only to the needs of the industrialized
States but also to those of the developing States.
UNEP will play a key role in the development of international
rules on the control of chemicals. Historically, the development of
rules on banned and severely restricted chemicals illustrates how the
rule-making machinery could work. Here the OECD had defined the
parameters of the international debate. It took a number of years and
extensive pressure to transform the OECD Guiding Principles, which
served the needs of industrialized countries, into a regulatory concept
193. Ian C. Ballon, The Implications of Making the Denial of Internationally Recognized
Worker Rights Actionable UnderSection 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,28 VA. J. INT'L L. 73, 88127 (1987); Harlan Mandel, Note, In Pursuitof the Missing Link: InternationalWorkers Rights
andInternationalTrade?,27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 443 (1989); see generally R.R. KERTON,
DOUBLE STANDARDS: CONSUMER AND WORKER PROTECTION IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD

(1990); James M. Zimmermann, ExtraterritorialApplication of FederalLabor Laws: Congress's
Flawed Extension of the ADEA, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 103 (1988).

194. Tankers: Double Trouble, ECONOMIST, Apr. 21-27, 1990, at 31.
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that fits into a world where developing countries play an ever increasing role. The compromise between the United States and the EC
Member States could serve as a model for the drafting of an international convention. Any UNEP effort, however, must consider its effects on international trade, for a solution will only be found in
coordination with GATT. GATT may require a broader approach,
integrating not only chemicals but also pesticides, in order to forge an
international consensus on the control of pesticides and chemicals.
C.

National Involvement in the Control of Chemicals and Pesticides
and International Perspectives for Action

The relatively rapid compromise between the United States and
the European Community on the regulation of chemicals was facilitated by the fact that new regulatory models and new administrative
procedures had to be constructed to cope with chemicals. It is far
easier to come to an international solution on the control of dangerous
substances if there is no need to overcome national administrative
structures and traditions. The same is true for the regulation of
banned and severely restricted chemicals and pesticides. The PIC procedure is a novelty; it is a genuine international instrument. There are
no national traditions to be changed. An international convention on
chemicals could benefit from the relatively young legal infrastructure.
The convention could step into the vacuum in the field of consumer
and environmental protection, leaving space for the introduction of
regulatory concepts that go beyond the premarket control mechanisms
that the industrialized States established.
The development of international regulation of pesticides and
medicines shows that it is very difficult, almost impossible, to forge a
common control mechanism. Although the FAO Code provides a registration procedure, a number of industrialized countries have introduced prior approval procedures that go far beyond the FAO
compromise. The philosophy of the FAO Code sets the tone for the
future regulation of chemicals. International rules never should be
more than a common platform for States. The States must remain free
to leave the platform and establish stricter standards to protect
humans and the environment.
D.

Trends in the Control of Chemicals and Pesticides

An analysis of national, regional, and international rules reveals an
overall trend toward establishing premarket control procedures.
Premarket control is widely accepted in the field of pesticides, and a
consensus has almost been reached in the regulation of chemicals as
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well. The best prospect for international regulation is an approach
that relies on notification procedures and on concepts of shared responsibility between manufacturers and government agencies.
However, concentration on the premarket control of chemicals
and pesticides suffers from a major deficiency. It focuses too closely
on the control of newly introduced chemicals and pesticides, thereby
neglecting the dangers of chemicals and pesticides that have been or
still are circulating without having been effectively controlled before
marketing. Such a focus is also inadequate in cases where risks become evident only after chemicals or pesticides have been subject to
some form of premarket control. The most advanced industrialized
countries are discovering the necessity of establishing effective
postmarket control mechanisms.
Deviating market restrictions, however, close markets and run
counter to the idea of free trade without technical barriers. Harmonizing access to the world market by introducing common premarket
control mechanisms is one side of the coin, harmonizing postmarket
control is the other. The international regulation of banned and severely restricted chemicals and pesticides, mainly in the form of the
PIC procedure, constitutes an important move towards the development of international postmarket control management, but so far it is
based on final regulatory action. What is needed is a mechanism that
guarantees the collection and dissemination of risks in order to decide,
at an international level, which products should be subject to market
restrictions.
The PIC procedure is a remarkable innovation in that it provides
for the review of products not yet on the red-flag list. However, the
necessary controls should be accomplished by a joint FAO/UNEP
program in cooperation with the OECD to determine the most dangerous chemicals and pesticides on the market and to formulate common criteria for testing and decision making. Nonetheless, even such
a joint international approach will need unilateral action to keep
moving.

